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INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT:
BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE "The longer I have watched events, from a close-up view, the more I have come to the conclusion that most of our mistakes, and troubles, are not due to natural faults of judgement. But that the real cause lies in the habit-on all sides-of saying something less, or something more, than we know to be true. This almost universal practice of distorting simple matters of fact, whether by suppression or exaggeration, is inspired by concern for the interests of party, class, or profession-at bottom this so-called loyalty being too often self-interest." agencies into a new organization charged with the responsibility of shoring up the nation's defenses against terrorism. 2 A critical mission of this new organization will be analyzing and promulgating information on terrorist threats to the government and people of the United States.
To be successful, the DHS must fuse information provided by national-level intelligence organizations with that from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs There is only so much money to go around and the administration will funnel it toward the organizations that appear to be getting the most "bang for the buck." In this regard, law enforcement would push for quick arrests instead of waiting for a larger, more significant bust sometime in the future. The military doesn't face the dilemma of having to demonstrate its value on a yearly basis. The military budget is almost always robust and competition is usually limited to interservice rivalries over key projects and weapon systems.
An Emerald in the Rough
Attacking the drug problem has often been compared to the story of the two blind men and the elephant. If your information is limited, you will not be able to identify or understand the entire problem. Sharing information is a necessity in the military. Data is collected worldwide from multiple sources and funneled to analysts tasked with evaluating the information and producing actionable intelligence for operating forces. This intelligence process is well established and networked throughout the Department of Defense. Strategic intelligence is generated at the national level while operational and tactical intelligence is produced at lower 6 Holland, interview. an "intelligence map" of the various drug cartels. Once achieved, this map would allow law enforcement to take down the key players in a manner similar to the FBI's campaign against organized crime in the 1970s and 80s.
An early version of EMERALD was distributed to the JTFs and some law enforcement offices in 1991. From the start it was clear that the fusion of strategic and tactical information would be an enormous challenge. The problem centered around two distinct areas: evidentiary concerns and information classification. Case agents refused to enter data pertaining to ongoing cases for fear that this information could end up as evidence in other trials. 10 If this type of data were entered into EMERALD, it would become available to defense attorneys through the discovery process and could conceivably jeopardize additional prosecutions. As such, law enforcement would only offer data from completed cases. This information was usually dated and pertained to organizations that were already successfully disrupted.
The law enforcement community's lack of an established intelligence apparatus compounded this problem. Agents were too busy to enter old data when their current caseload was full. Intelligence assistants were teamed with agents, so they too focused on current operations. Military intelligence analysts were offered access to old law enforcement case files, but this load of information proved difficult to exploit since they were not familiar with the sources or information. Uncovering the sheet of critical information from the reams of administrative data proved to be a very labor-intensive job-something the military was not willing to do. This inability to populate the database with highly classified or case sensitive information doomed EMERALD from the start. Moreover, each law enforcement organization wanted the EMERALD database to focus on their particular issues or jurisdictions. In the end, so many distinct and divisive information technology (IT) requirements were levied upon DIA that the EMERALD project was given to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) for management. 13 There it died a quiet death in a budget cutback during the mid-1990s. Neither the military nor the law enforcement community mourned its passing.
11 Myers, interview.
12 Westbrook, interview. Each of these success stories shared three common denominators that facilitated cooperation between military intelligence and law enforcement. First, each example represented a specific, short-term case with a clearly defined mission. There was a definite "endgame" or goal whereby success could be measured by a specific seizure or arrest. Second, there were clear lines of authority. The law enforcement organization took the lead with the military playing a supporting role. There was no ambiguity regarding how the operation was to unfold and no concern of one law enforcement organization encroaching upon another. Third, these operations worked well because the military and law enforcement were willing to share the credit for success. The military was eager to show it was contributing to the new war on drugs while the law enforcement agency was able to claim another successful arrest-a claim it would not have to share with another law enforcement "budget competitor."
These examples were successful, in large part, because the military effort did not disrupt the law enforcement status quo. While this bilateral system worked in select cases, it did not leverage the full counterdrug capability of the United States. Imagine how effective the United
States would be if it took the unique capability of each law enforcement agency and combined it with the intelligence power of the military. The EMERALD database tried to do just that on a very modest level, yet it failed miserably. What must the new Department of Homeland Security do to leverage the capabilies of its own agencies as well as those of organizations outside its control?
They Can Be Molded
The bilateral approach worked because it was based on trust. Gregory Treverton, Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council early in the Clinton Administration, discovered that cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement was ragged at best. "Out of concern for our civil liberties, we prevented them from becoming too close." 23 The 11 September terror attacks, however, have changed how we as Americans view this relationship. The clarion call for greater cooperation will now require both sides to take a critical look at the cultural barriers that have divided them for years.
The Department of Homeland Security will look to replace the old mantra of prosecution with one of prevention. The new emphasis will not be on building cases, but shift toward the military emphasis on disrupting terrorist operations. National-level intelligence organizations, on the other hand, must also adjust their perceived role and mission. Military intelligence, designed to monitor and assess enemy military capabilities, must now learn from their law enforcement brethren. The military's inability to track and capture Mohammed Farah Aideed in Somalia and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan proves they must move from an emphasis on reconnaissance and strategic warning to one of surveillance and tactical warning, where constant contact is maintained on terrorist suspects.
law enforcement agencies will still prosecute traditional criminals. What the DHS must do is articulate the middle ground where international terrorists operate and establish itself as an honest broker for intelligence and law enforcement to trust one another. The Department of Homeland Security was established to counter the terrorist threat, but perhaps its most daunting task is to bring together two communities whose organizational cultures have been moving in different directions.
